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We economists know that we cannot make laboratory experiments on
national economic systems. If, however, we could devise and build a
miniature national economy, complete in every detail, which behaved
exactly like a real one but on a much-speeded-up time scale, and if we
could adjust its parameters and then manipulate policies and exogenous
events while recording time histories of its economic variables--then
we could gain tremendous understanding by experimenting with it. We
can't quite do this either, because we are forced by practical consid-
erations to simplify the representation of the economy, using aggregate
variables, and omitting many details. We can, however, with the help
of a computing machine, simulate and explore an economic-system model
which, although not a perfect counterpart of the actual 1economy, be-
haves much more realistically than any model that can be dealt with by
conventional analytic techniques.
A symposium of articles in the December, 1960, American Economic
Review1 gave an overall picture of the state of the art of simulation,
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2with some of its history, rationale, methods, and typical applications.
Bibliographies with these articles covered a wide variety of simulations
and background material, (unfortunately omitting, however, the interest-
ing analog work of A.W. Phillips).2
The purpose of this article is to illustrate how the technique of
simulation can be used to study problems of economic development and
foreign trade policy for an underdeveloped country. Graphical and
numerical results from a few computer runs are presented and compared
to show how simulatipn might actually be used as an aid in formulating
a development investment program.
These runs are a small sample selected from about two hundred made
during experiments on the model described below. The parameters and
initial values of variables in the model were based largely on the
Indian economy as of 1951. The development programs and policies which
were tried out on the model, however, were purely hypothetical and do
not have any relation to actual experience or plans of the Indian gov-
ernment. No policy recommendations for India should be inferred from
the results presented, because, for simplification, several considera-
tions have been omitted which might be crucial for India. The work
done was partly a process of developing a technique, and partly a
study of some hypothetical situations. Use of this method for guidance
of policy in real situations is a phase that is yet to come.
2 Phillips, A.W., "Mechanical Models in Economic Dynamics,"
Economica, August, 1950, and "Stabilization Policy and the Time-Forms
of Lagged Responses, " The Economic Journal, June, 1957.
3 This work was part of the research program of the Center for
International Studies at M.I.T. and was financed jointly by that Center
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I. The Simulation Approach
To some economists and mathematicians, simulation is either
uninteresting or positively wrong because it provides no general
solutions. Numerical results are produced for one special case after
another, but general conclusions can be reached only rarely and then
they depend partly on inference. Several powerful advantages, however,
outweigh this limitation when dynamic problems of complex systems are
to be studied.
Some conclusions from Dr. Gillespies's study of exchange-rate
4
devaluation illustrate the value of being able to work with a relative-
ly complete system--one which provides for dynamic interactions between
aspects of the economy that are usually analyzed in isolation from each
other. It was found that--for this particular model and set of condi-
tions--the most important determinants of the effectiveness of devalua-
tion were not the frequently-analyzed elasticies of demand but the
induced effects on the pattern of investment allocation and the ability
of the system to resist inflation of prices. The resistance to inflation,
and two'other M.I.T. units: the Research Laboratory of Electronics, and
the Sloan Research Fund of the School of Industrial Management. An
earlier analog simulation project, out of which this project developed,
was financed by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Assistance in
making the transition to the digital computer, using the DYNAM program,
was rendered by the Industrial Dynamics Group of the School of Industrial
Management. Services of an IBM 704 computer were provided by the M.I.T.
Computation Center.
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4in turn, proved upon further testing to be very sensitive to the speed
with which consumers adjust their expenditures to changes of income.
These results cannot, of course, be taken as general, being based
on a partial survey of a particular model. However, they do make it
clear that some of the most innocent-appearing ceteris paribus assump-
tions can be treacherous, and that exchange-rate policy had better not
be decided purely on the basis of comparative statics. Farsighted
theoreticians and policy-makers have already described the processes
involved here and how they pertain to the effectiveness of a devalua-
tion.5 But until the development of simulation, the means of exploring
the problem fully have been lacking, and little has been done about it
on the theoretical level beyond discussion.
Besides the ability to include more aspects of the system simul-
taneously, simulation has the advantage of permitting comparatively
realistic representation of all sorts of nonlinearities, discontinu-
ities, time delays, and irreversibilities. Inclusion of such charac-
teristics at the appropriate points is usually crucial for reproducing
the modes of dynamic behavior that can occur in the real system.
An important aspect of simulation is that the problem is not for-
mulated in terms of a welfare function or performance criterion to be
maximized. Thus it is not necessary to try to formulate value judgments
5 See, for instance: Alexander, Sidney S., "Effects of a Devalua-
tion," American Economic Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 1, March, 1959, and
Gutt, Camille, "Policies to Make Devaluation Effective," in Money,
Trade, and Economic Growth, Macmillan, New York, 1951.
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in abstract terms and in a vacuum beforehand. This is advantageous
when it comes to evaluating the relative importance of increasing
employment, increasing income, restraining inflation, maintaining
stability of the foreign-exchange rate, and various other goals. It
also allows a clearer separation of the technical investigation from
the process of deciding on policy. The investigator can be like an
architect, submitting alternative designs for discussion and criticism
and eventually for selection by the decision-maker.
It is not to be expected that simulation, using an approximate
model whose parameters are not precisely known, will produce an accurate
forecast for a ten-, twenty-, or thirty-year period. Apart from short-
comings of the model, events exogenous to the real system may easily
start cumulative processes leading to major deviations from what was
otherwise the most probable outcome. In a study of planning and poli-
cies for long-run objectives the aim must be to establish approximately
a consistent and feasible pattern of targets, to discover what differ-
ences will result from any given change in program, what side effects
are likely to be induced by any given policy, how to deal with such
side effects if they develop as well as with disturbances from outside
the system, and what variables provide the best signals to tell when
trouble lies ahead or to tell whether a given policy is being overdone
or underdone. A part of any study must also be devoted to testing for
the effects of changes in parameter values, and developing ways to make
the success of a program relatively insensitive to errors in estimating
the parameters.
6To approach even some of these goals takes a great deal of experi-
mentation. In looking at the examples below, one should bear in mind
that these are only a sample, from which no final conclusions could be
drawn without considerably more exploration of alternatives and of the
way and extent to which changes in assumptions might change the results.
II. The Economic-System Model
An actual economy, developing and having growing pains, is observed
and analyzed in terms of the time histories of such variables as:
Gross national product (current prices)
Real gross national product
Consumers' price index, and price indexes for various
categories of goods
Investment, in various sectors, and total
Production from various sectors
Imports (various types)
Exports
Balance of payments
The model described here was formulated with the aim of making
these variables behave realistically under dynamic conditions. This
meant representing underlying processes of adjustment pertinent to
non-equilibrium situations rather than merely relationships whidh must
exist between variables when they are in equilibrium.
7Thus, for example, long-run supply curves were not used, because
the relation between price and supply quantity at any future time will
be affected by the particular paths along which some of the other vari-
ables move during the process of change and because the occurrence of
a long-run-type equilibrium is extremely improbable under the conditions
for which the model was designed to be used.
Instead, supply functions for the various sectors of the econony
were formulated in terms of very-short-run supply curves whose para-
meters were subject to continuous change reflecting changes in avail-
able fixed capital, prices of intermediate goods, wage rates, and labor
productivity. A short-run supply curve for the product of one of the
industrial sectors would look at a particular time like curve a of
Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1. Short Run Supply Curves
8The part of the curve to the left of the kink is based on variable
costs, with some plants in the sector idle, while to the right of the
kink all plants are operating and prices are affected by scarcity.
If net capital formation were carried out with no change in wages
or intermediate-goods prices, the -supply curve at some later time would
have shifted horizontally to a position like b. (The lowering of the
intercept on the price axis reflects increased productivity in new,
technically improved plants. The old intercept point has now shifted
horizontally to a greater value of sectoral output, and some of the
right-hand end of the curve has vanished with the attrition of old
capital.)
If the same capital formation had been accompanied by a 50 per
cent increase in wages and other prices, the short-run supply curve
would have shifted to c instead of b.
This sketchy description merely illustrates one of the many
dynamic relationships from which the economic-system model is built.
The rest of this section gives a general description of the overall
plan of the model. More of its detailed characteristics can be
inferred from the discussion of the sample results.6
The model includes production, capital formation, income, consump-
tion, and foreign commerce, with money flows distinguished from real
6 A complete specification of the model fills 167 pages and
requires more than 250 equations. It is included in the Center for
International Studies report C/60-1o: A Model for Simulating Dynamic
Problems of Economic Development by Edward P. Holland, Benjamin Tencer,
and Robert W. Gillespie.
9goods, and with various price mechanisms. Domestic production is
separated into six sectors, of which most have supply curves like
Figure 1, shifting as explained above. Associated with each of these
is a capacity-creating activity which can maintain or expand the sec-
tor's capacity or allow it to decay. Capacity creation is a time-
consuming process, involving payments to factors and purchase of
capital goods during the gestation period. Once created, units of
capacity remain in being throughout statistically distributed life
spans.
The rate of starting the capacity-creation process is determined
in two different ways in different sectors. In agriculture, non-power-
using consumer goods, and public overhead services it is strictly a
matter of following a program. Different programs are used for dif-
ferent runs, but the program is exogenous to the model. (The basis for
assuming this sort of program is discussed in the next section.) In
the capital and intermediate goods sector and in the power-using con-
sumer goods sector, there are endogenous investment decision functions,
responding to the current or expected rate of profit relative to the
cost of new capital facilities. The profit-motivated function may,
when policy requires, be either restrained or augmented.
Among the producing sectors, and between the capacity-creating
activities and certain producing sectors, technical input-output
coefficients determine intermediate demands. These relationships, and
others to be described below, are indicated in Figure 2.
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Current production and investment determine gross national income,
which is modified by taxes and then enters a consumers' demand function.
This function has characteristics of a classic multidimensional indif-
ference map, determining the allocation of expenditures in response to
income and prices. The demand for food becomes proportionately less as
per-capita real income rises, in keeping with Engel's Law, while savings
and the demands for other goods and for services proportionately in-
crease. Various goods (including imported ones) are substitutable for
each other, at diminishing marginal rates. This demand function and
the supply functions for the various consumer goods interact continu-
ously to adjust prices as conditions change.
In addition to the domestic economy, there are foreign supplies
of consumer, intermediate, and capital goods, and a demand function for
exports. Exchange rates, tariffs, and other controls can be held fixed
or manipulated.
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III. Specifications for a Run
A general picture of the characteristics and structure of the
economic-system model has been given above. Before going on to see how
it performed in a particular run, however, it is necessary to know more
precisely what functions and constraints were included as aspects of
policy, what variables were assigned exogenous values or time-paths,
and what degrees of freedom were left open.
A development plan was specified in terms of two sets of time-
schedules. For Sectors 2, 4, and 5--Agriculture, Non-powered Consumer-
goods Production, and Public Overhead Services--specific time-programs
of real capital creation were set up and rigidly followed. This does
not imply that the enterprises in these sectors are necessarily
government-operated, although some may be. The assumption is that it
is government policy that determines the level of capital formation,
but the actual investment may be carried out by private entrepreneurs.
It has been observed in India, for example, that very little invest-
ment takes place in agriculture in regions where no government activity
is carried out. Community development programs are an effort by the
government to help and encourage villagers to undertake improvements in
their facilities and in their methods. Irrigation dams and canals,
built by the government, must, to be useful, be supplemented by local
ditches and banks built by individuals or local groups. Thus the pri-
vately implemented activity tends to be determined by that of the gov-
ernment.
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Development of the small-scale and cottage industries lumped
together in Sector 4 is, in India, induced largely by government incen-
tive, even though the actual firms are privately owned. In Sector 5
there is a combination of private enterprises encouraged and regulated
by government--such as part of housing--with purely government-owned
utilities like power and railroads. For the purposes of this study we
are not concerned with ownership, nor with the question of how control
is effected, but only with the fact that in these three sectors it is
a reasonable approximation to assume that government policies control
the rate of capital formation.
For Sectors 1 and 3--the modern industrial sectors producing
respectively consumers' goods and intermediate and capital goods--
time-programs of minimum real capital creation were used. These
sectors, as described earlier, have private investment decision func-
tions based on profits, and it is expected that these endogenous
mechanisms will bring about appropriate growth of the two sectors.
However, in the event that either of these sectors should lag too far
behind the rest of the economy, it is assumed that some action will be
taken to stimulate it--perhaps direct government investment, perhaps
financial incentives to private investment; again we do not identify
the means of carrying out the policy but assume that some action can
be devised that will prevent capital formation in these sectors from
falling below the specified minimum at any time.
It may seem too visionary to talk of planning investment programs
twenty years into the future. These must not be taken as plans that
would be carved in granite or made integral parts of the national
constitution. The purpose of a long-range plan is to provide a per-
spective within which to work out the short-range steps. Like an
itinerary for a long trip, it should be subject to revision whenever
new knowledge or new opportunities warrant, or whenever unexpected
obstacles require taking a detour. At any time, it is desirable to
have some vision of the long-run goal, as well as more detailed targets
for the shorter run together with plans for attaining them. Thus a
twenty-year projection provides a frame of reference within which to
work out a five-year plan, so that the five-year planners will not, for
example, underrate worthwhile projects that take six years to become
productive.
Besides the capital-formation profiles--definite ones for Sectors
2, 4, and 5, and minimum levels for Sectors 1 and 3--specifications of
foreign-trade policy were included. The exchange rate was fixed, with
no provision for changing it in this run. A tariff mechanism was set
up to protect the capital-and-intermediate goods sector by raising the
tariff on equivalent imported goods if domestic capacity became idle.
A tariff on consumers' imports was set up in case of a crisis in the
balance of payments (defined, for this run, as a current-account de-
ficit greater than 500 million dollars per year). A definite schedule
was assumed for tapering off food imports during the first ten years as
home production expanded.
Other assumptions were made, not as policies, but to tie down exo-
genous variables. The prices (in foreign currency) of imported goods of
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each type were set at fixed values, independent of quantity and without
time variations. The demand for export goods was also devoid of time-
trend or cycles, but was made sensitive to price, with a value of -1.3
for the elasticity. Population was assumed to grow exponentially with
a growth coefficient of .02 per year.
No limit was set either on deficit financing of investment (govern-
ment and private) or on the deficit on current account in the. balance of
foreign payments. This does not imply that projections of these deficits
would not be major considerations in planning, or that their actual mag-
nitudes would be ignored in practice. The deficits are determined, how-
ever, by the operation of mechanisms which have already been fully speci-
fied. As a technique of investigation, they are left open-ended; the
resulting inflation and the foreign-exchange deficit are among the
criteria that will be used later in this article for comparing different
runs.
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IV. A Sample History7
An economic history of the hypothetical country for a twenty year
period is shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. This is part of the
output generated in one computer run, referred to here as Run A. In
addition to plotting the points through which these graphs were drawn,
the computer tabulated values of about eighty variables by half-year
intervals. (The computations wers made at intervals of 1/20th of a
year, approximating a continuous process, and involved many additional
variables, but it would not be worthwhile to record every step of the
computations.)
For this particular run a relatively intense investment program
was carried out. Agriculture (Sector 2) was expanded enough to replace
food imports and increase the food supply about four per cent per year,
twice as fast as the population was growing. Primary emphasis, however,
was on the public overhead sector (Sector 5). The capital and inter-
mediate goods industries (Sector 3) also were prominent in the program
and received considerably more emphasis than the consumer goods indus-
tries (Sectors 1 and 4). The real investment carried out in each sector
is shown in the bottom part of Figure 3.
In Sectors 2, 4, and 5, as explained above, these real investments
were rigidly programmed. In Sector.3, the profit-motivated level of
investment rarely came up to the programmed minimum; thus, the latter
7 Most of the time-history graphs presented in this and the next
section are from the doctoral thesis (still in preparation) of Benjamin
Tencer. A few are from additional runs made by the present author.
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almost always became the actual value. In Sector 1, on the other hand,
the private investment induced by profit expectations was almost always
above the low minimum set by the program.
With this investment program as prime mover, and with unlimited
credit and foreign exchange, the gross national product in current
prices increased dramatically--at an average rate of 7.5 per cent per
year (see the middle part of Figure 3). A large part of this increase,
however, was not growth of real output but only a rising price level.
Even so, real gross national product, as shown, became more than two
and a half times as great in twenty years, an average growth rate of
4.8 per cent per year. Growth of real disposable income per capita
averaged 2.8 per cent per year.
Gross investinent is shown as a percentage of gross national pro-
duct at the top of Figure 3. This percentage was a dependent variable,
inasmuch as G.N.P. was generated within the system while real invest-
ment was independently programmed. Starting from about ten per cent of
national product at the beginning of the run, gross investment increased
to twenty per cent in the middle of the run and then declined very
slightly. Figure 3 also shows the annual rate of increase of the con-
sumers' price index, which was in the neighborhood of three per cent
per year throughout most of the run, and the balance-of-payments
deficit on current account, to be discussed below.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of prices and wages, the changing
pattern of consumption, and, at the bottom, the various components of
foreign trade and the resulting balance on current account. Except in
80fl
600
0
2000
I-
z
w
20 020
RUN A.
0
z
I-
0
u
-1.5
20
15
z
Lii
l-
z
-J
5LU
a
0
-o
2
N
2
C9
-.
0 5 10 YEARS 15
FIGURE 3. A SAMPLE HISTORY: PART OF RESULTS FROM
4 .
z 0 PRICES AND WAGES
W1
z Poz
P2
aD -a
.-.. P5 50
SEE FIGURE 2
FOR KEY TO
SECTOR NUMBERS
0 - -.... --.. 40 >-5 10 YEARES 15
RUNu ArACOUT
OEE AL FIG. A L F
.. .... .... ..... .... .......... --.. -- .. -- .-.-.-- 3 0
C :4
CONSUMPTION
C5
..... .. ... .... ... .. ..o 4 ,f...... 20
Q4 \z
0
.'~ 1 5 ----. ... .... . . ...... .... .. .I. ... I -. -. -+ --------.... 10 E
O . """ EX0T
PROoUCER!S IMPORTS.L
46 CAPITAL GOODS
... ... ....... INTERNEDIATE GO00S .. .... -..- --------- -. 5
CONSUMERS" IMPOIRTS, -
F0 : OTHER
- 14--AYMENTS m(CURRENT ACCOUN I
S5 10 YE A RS 15 20
FIGURE 4. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM RUN A.
A -~
z.
4z
I,
Go
FOD OTHER
N .4- BALANCE OF
--.,4.-PAYMENTS
(CURRENT ACCOUNT)
10 YEARS 15
FIGURE 4. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM RUN A.
20
-
0
z
u*)
0
00.
Lu
1.5
z
.5
0
PRICES AND WAGES
P6
W1
P
...... ... ..... .  I . ... ... ..... ..... --..P 5
SEE FIGURE 2
FOR KEY TO
SECTOR NUMBERS
5 10 YEARS 15
CSEE ALSO FIG. V,
Cl C4CONSUMPTION
-- -O
Q4" '-\\i
2
C~ P
**-" EXPORTS
PRODUC1ERS'IMPORTS:
CPITAL GOODS
... .... ......... INTERMEDIATE GOODS.. ---- --- ---------
CONSUMERS IMPORTS:
0
z
-5
b
1.u
z
-. 1
-1.5
3
-4
50
40 >
U)
I-
z
30
30
0!
20
z0
10 Fn
0
20
Sector 5, where capacity was very rapidly expanding, prices rose
generally. Industrial wages rose even faster, partly because of
increasing labor productivity in the industrial sectors. The price
of consumers' imports, P 6, was rapidly elevated by an almost continuous
succession of tariff increases, intended to help improve the balance of
payments.
The growth of consumption of different kinds of goods and services
followed Engel's Law, in that expenditures on food, initially high, grew
less rapidly than other expenditures as per capita income grew. (This
refers to basic foodstuffs; extra processing of food is in a different
sector.) In addition to consumption measured in current values, the
graph includes physical quantity indexes for industrial manufactures
(Q1), small-scale and handicraft products (Q4), and consumers' non-food
imports (Q6). The choice among these three goods was relatively sensi-
tive to price changes. Thus, as P1 climbed more steeply than P4, the
consumption of Q4 caught up to and then exceeded that of Q1 (in terms
of quantity). It is evident also that the ever-increasing tariff
included in P6 was effective in holding down the quantity of Q6 con-
sumed.
Although consumers' expenditures on non-food imports, C6, doubled
in fifteen years and reached three and a half times the initial value
in twenty years, the increase went into tariff revenue and not into
payments abroad. In the bottom panel of Figure 4, where the balance-
of-payments components are shown, it can be seen that the expenditure
abroad for consumers' non-food imports was actually reduced during the
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first fifteen years, and in spite of some increase thereafter, was still
below the initial value by the twentieth year.
Imports of food were gradually tapered off during the first nine
and a half years as part of the program--not in response to market
forces. Imports of capital goods rose rapidly during the first twelve
years as required for the high rate of capital formation but declined
thereafter as the domestic capital goods sector reached a sufficiently
rapid rate of growth to begin taking over the supply. Imported inter-
mediate goods, on the other hand, were assumed to be of types for which
domestic substitutes were not developed within the twenty-year period.
Thus expansion of the economy induced ever-increasing imports in this
category. With exports declining because of the rising price of ex-
portable goods, and with imports of intermediate goods steadily rising,
the import-replacement process in the food and capital goods sectors
was not sufficient to bring the balance-of-payments deficit below the
billion dollar a year level.
The initial assumption that this balance-of-payments deficit could
be financed by long-term capital inflows is clearly open to question,
not only because of the magnitude of the accumulated deficit over the
twenty-year span but also because even at the end of the twenty years
the deficit continues at a rate of more than a billion dollars per year.
The rate of inflation, too, while not catastrophic, might be considered
undesirably high in itself (in addition to its adverse effect on foreign
trade). Thus, although the investment program and other policies used
in Run A produced a significant rate of economic growth, the results
22
cannot be accepted as satisfactory. Let us then see whether the program
can be modified to keep the price level from rising so fast and to re-
duce the amount of foreign exchange used up by the deficit in the balance
of payments.
V. Effects of Some Changes in Plans and Policies
This section and the related figures show how repeated simulation
runs with a series of cut-and-try changes can help in understanding the
dynamics of the system and can be used to design an improved plan for
the allocation and phasing of investment and improved policies for con-
trol of foreign trade. The end result of this series is by no means an
optimal solution, nor is it in fact an adequate solution for the long
run, inasmuch as another crisis is imminent at the end of the period
considered. Nevertheless, the series presented here shows the evo-
lution of some improvement and illustrates the process of investigation.
What is lacking is simply further application of the same approach to
arrive at a more satisfactory policy combination. The reader will no
doubt have a number of ideas for additional alternatives to be tried.
Run B: Considering that the price inflation and heavy imports of capital
goods in Run A are both associated with a high level of investment, it is
appropriate to try cutting back the investment program to see what improve-
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ment might be made in price stability and the balance of payments and
at what cost in growth of real output. Accordingly, Run B was made
with about twenty per cent less investment in Sector 2 (agriculture),
Sector 3 (capital and intermediate goods), and Sector 5 (public over-
head). The main variables from this trial are shown in Figure 5,
together with the corresponding graphs from Run A and from other runs
yet to be discussed. The less intense program, as expected, reduced
the balance-of-payments deficit significantly by reducing capital goods
imports. It is noteworthy, however, that the reduction in investment
did not reduce the rate of inflation at all. In fact, the final value
of the consumers' price index was actually a shade higher for Run B
than for Run A (1.65 against 1.62).
The reduction in investment, while ineffective in abating infla-
tion, caused a significant loss in growth of output. Starting from 106
billion rupees per year initially, real gross national product grew in
twenty years to 237 billion rupees per year in Run B, as compared with
270 billion in Run A. This is an average annual growth rate of 4.11
per cent per year, compared with 4.78 per cent per year.
These comparisons, and others to come, are summarized in the table
at the bottom of Figure 5.
Run C: An attempt was made to alleviate inflation by applying the fol-
lowing policy, leaving everything else as it was in Run B:
Whenever the rate of change of the consumers' price index reached
three per cent per year, the rate of starting new capital projects in
the industrial sectors (1, 3, and 5) was curtailed until such time as
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inflation of the price index fell below three per cent per year, where-
upon the program of Run B was resumed.
This policy was first invoked, in Run C, about eight and a half
years after the start, when the inflation rate first reached three per
cent per year. The resulting drop in investment is noticeable in the
graph at the top of Figure 5, while in the one just below, it can be
seen that the policy did indeed have the effect of reducing the rate
of inflation to less than the chosen limit. This was not a major re-
duction, however, since it hd not been very much above three per cent
for much of the time in Run B. A slight drop in currently-priced na-
tional product is noticeable, but real product was almost identical in
the two runs. The most notable effect of this "anti-inflation" policy
proved to be a reduction in the balance-of-payments deficit, through
reduced imports of capital goods.
Run E:8 The fact that reducing industrial investment during part of
Run C saved foreign exchange and slightly reduced inflation without
hurting real growth suggests that the investment pattern was too heav-
ily biased toward the industrial sectors and that some gain might be
effected by shifting emphasis away from some of them. Run E was pro-
grammed with ten per cent less investment in public overhead capital
than Run C, but with a twenty-five per cent increase in agricultural
investment. The graphs and table tell the story: significantly less
inflation, higher real output, and another 800 million dollar saving
in foreign currency.
8 Runs D and F have been omitted from the sequence.
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Run G: Between Run E and Run G a good many exploratory runs were
actually made, and the program was changed in several respects. The
investment pattern was changed further in the direction of less public
overhead (Sector 5) and more agricultural expansion (Sector 2). The
capital and intermediate goods program (Sector 3) was smoothed out a
bit and built up a little earlier, while investment in non-food con-
sumer goods manufactures (Sector 1) was accelerated after the tenth
year. Only in non-powered consumer goods production was the program
left unchanged. The new investment profiles (as they actually ran,
including some spontaneous investment) are compared with those of Runs
A and E in Figure 6. The changes in the Sector 3 program, which were
intended to smooth out the actual investment profile in that sector,
did not have that effect, but instead simply changed the timing of the
fluctuations in spontaneous investment.
As a measure to inhibit inflation, especially when a sudden policy
change might set up a sharp transient stimulus (e.g., when the currency
is devalued), the time lag in the wage increase function was doubled,
implying some sort of wage control policy. This change does not alter
the equilibrium or target level toward which wages move under any given
set of conditions but slows down their adjustment toward that target.
For the first ten years, this program gave a much better result
than the previous ones.1 Real gross national product grew faster, with
less inflation and with a diminishing balance-of-payments deficit. With
the main emphasis on sectors requiring less capital goods, capital goods
imports were eliminated after nine and a half years, at the same time
lRefer again to Figure 5.
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that food imports were phased out, and just after the balance-of-
payments deficit had been brought to zero.
With no further import-substitution possibilities, the character
of the process then changed. The steady increase in imports of consumer
goods and intermediate goods, which until then had been offset by the
decline in other imports, rapidly built up a new balance-of-payments
deficit. In conjunction with the increasing import surplus, the con-
tinuing expansion of agriculture brought inflation to a stop and even
started a decline in the consumers' price index from the twelfth year
on.
By the time the current account balance-of-payments deficit had
grown from zero to 600 million dollars per year in four years, and was
still increasing at about the same rate, it seemed time for some drastic
countermeasures. Several experiments were tried, only one of which is
presented here, namely Run G.
In Run G, at the point when the deficit reached 600 million dollars
per year (13- 3 /4 years from the start), the currency was devalued so
that 50 per cent more rupees were required in exchange for a dollar,
and at the same time a twenty per cent tariff was imposed on consumers'
imports.
The short-run impact was a 750-million-dollar-per-year improvement
in the current account, as seen in Figure 5. Of the total, 600 million
was from reduced consumer-goods imports and 150 million from increased
exports. This improvement may be regarded as permanent, if the alter-
native assumption is that the fast-growing deficit could have been
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financed and allowed tq go on indefinitely. Even so, however, the
long-run problem was not solved, but only deferred. Although the defi-
cit was greatly reduced, its rate of growth was evidently not affected,
as one can see by comparing the slopes of the balance-of-payments graph
of Figure 5 for the periods before and after the devaluation, (before
Year 13 1/2 and after Year 14 1/2). By the twentieth year the deficit
had reached 700 million dollars per year and showed no sign of leveling
off.
Although Run G ended with a problem still to be solved, the same
is true of all the previous ones, and on several counts this run was an
improvement over the others. The growth of output was a little faster
than in Run A, and :significantly faster than in the intervening runs,
while the overall rise in the price index was the least, and the total
drain on foreign exchange reserves was only a fraction of that in the
other runs. (See the table in Figure 5.) On the other hand, the slow-
er accumulation of industrial productive facilities left the economy at
the end of the run less well equipped for future expansion.
If this were an actual operational planning study, of course, much
would remain to be done, but as a demonstration of principles and methods
it has gone far enough.
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VI. Concluding Observations
From the comparison of runs presented here, no substantive conclu-
sions can be drawn. In fact, a critical consideration of the results
is more likely to lead to questions about the assumptions of the study
and suggestions for experimenting with other assumptions.
The great improvement made by reducing investment in public over-
head capital could mean either of two things: It could mean that the
original program was actually too heavily slanted toward public over-
head capital, or it could mean that the assumptions about requirements
for overhead services were not realistic. Certainly the latter pos-
sibility should be carefully examined before the former could be
accepted.
The assumptions about foreign demand for exports and home demand
for imported intermediate goods made the balance-of-payments problem
almost unsolvable. The rigidity of these assumptions undoubtedly
exaggerates the true situation. However, they are by no means to-
tally unrealistic for some stages in the growth of underdeveloped
economies.
There is, of course, nothing unique about simulation that makes
its results any more dependent on assumptions than any other method.
The assumptions in such a model as this are so explicit and so numerous
as to emphasize the dependence. It is less noticeable in more simpli-
fied analyses where it is implicitly assumed that all sorts of things
can simply be omitted from the model, but it is no less limiting.
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From the series of examples presented here it is apparent that an
evaluation of policy alternatives for an actual situation could well
involve scores or even hundreds of runs, depending on the problem ad-
dressed, the freedom available for variations in different dimensions
of policy, and the degree of certainty with which the model structure
is known. In reality, foreign trade policy and investment allocation
in a development program are dynamically interdependent. It would
usually seem best, therefore, to analyze them together. When it is
possible to narrow down the analysis to one or the other of these
problems it will be possible to arrive at some conclusions with a
considerably smaller number of runs. Not much will be saved, however,
in the statistical research and other work involved in formulating the
model.
The formulation of the model for a simulation study is crucial and
requires adequate research and good judgment. The techniques of com-
puter programming have developed to such a point that almost anyone can
set up some kind of a model and--after some initial difficulties--get
it to work. The results, however, may be thoroughly misleading if the
model does not correspond suitably to what it is supposed to represent.
The importance of careful formulation of the model applies both to its
qualitative structure and to the numerical magnitudes involved. Actually
a good deal of insight can be gained--as has often been done with engi-
neering systems--by experimenting with a model with the right qualita-
tive features, such as nonlinearities and time lags, even without much
knowledge of the numerical values of the parameters. At least, from
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such a hypothetical study one can learn what modes of dynamic behavior
are possible and which parameters are critical in determining which
mode will prevail.
In problems of dynamics it is probably more important to have
these qualitative features represented in the right places than it is
to have accurate numerical estimates of the parameters. It is certain-
ly open to question even what it means to have highly accurate estimates
of the parameters of a model which is qualitatively wrong. On the other
hand, many issues hinge on the quantitative values of parameters. With-
out some reasonably reliable statistical estimates we are likely to find
that certain policy choices simply cannot be made one way or the other.
Without some knowledge of the orders of magnitude of the quantities we
are dealing with, it is not even possible to formulate a good model
qualitatively, for any model must be a simplification, omitting many
aspects of reality, and we need some basis for judging what can safely
be omitted. It is not great precision, but reliable approximations
that are needed.
Simulation, thus, is no substitute for empirical research. In fact
it sharpens the need both for statistical information and for accurate
descriptions of relationships and dynamic processes. With a model care-
fully formulated from such foundations, the possibilities for increasing
understanding of economic dynamics in general and developing workable
policies for particular situations are tremendous.
